Gender differences in human behaviour have attracted generations of social scientists, who have explored whether males and females act differently in domains involving competition, risk taking, cooperation, altruism, honesty, as well as many others. Yet, little is known about gender differences in the equity-efficiency trade-off. This gap is particularly important, because people in power of redistributing resources often face a conflict between equity and efficiency, to the point that this trade-off has been named as "the central problem in distributive justice". The recently introduced Trade-Off Game (TOG) -in which a decision-maker has to choose between being equitable or being efficient -offers a unique opportunity to fill this gap. To this end, I analyse gender differences on a large dataset including all N=4,920 TOG decisions (divided in 23 experimental treatments) collected by my research group since we introduced this game. I find two major results: (i) females are more likely than males to choose the equitable option; (ii) gender differences are moderated by the moral framing of the TOG: they are particularly evident when the equitable option is framed as being the right thing to do, compared to when the moral frame is placed on the efficient option. These findings suggest that males and females have different preferences for resource distribution, and point to new avenues for future research.
Introduction
After the 2016 Central Italy earthquake, which destroyed dozens of small mountain villages, killed hundreds of people, and left tens of thousands of other people homeless, the Italian Government found itself in the middle of a fundamental decisional conflict. MPs had to decide in which areas to build the temporary houses to host the survivors who had lost their house as a consequence of the seism. These temporary accommodations were meant to host the survivors for a relatively long time, estimated to about 10 years, while waiting for the actual reconstruction of their old houses. For this reason, the survivors had a strong preference for having these temporary houses built in the same place, or very near to, where they used to live before the quake. The conflict emerged because this "equitable" solution, which would have satisfied all the survivors, was impracticable from the Government point of view: eliminating the rubbles in a reasonable time frame, reaching nearly inaccessible mountain villages with the trucks, and build, in each of these villages, a relatively small number of houses (some of these villages had only 20 inhabitants), would have exponentially inflated the cost and the time needed for the intervention. From the point of view of the Government, the most "efficient" solution was to select one single area and build all the temporary houses in this area. However, this solution was perceived to be highly unequal from the survivors: it would have satisfied some of them (those who happened to live near the selected area), and it would have dissatisfied others (those who happened to live far). This is only one example of the tension between equity and efficiency. A more classical case is taxation: according to Okun's "leaky bucket" argument, taxation is always inefficient, as administering the tax has a cost (Okun, 2015) . The problem is, in fact, much deeper and relies in the often-unavoidable discrepancy between the natural and the equitable distributions of resources: the natural distribution of resources is often unequal, and creating equity is often costly. This generates a fundamental conflict between equity and efficiency, which has been named as "the central problem of distributive justice" (Hsu, Anen & Quartz, 2008) or "the big tradeoff" (Okun, 2015) . People in power of resource distribution often face this conflict. For this reason, understanding what individual factors affect this trade-off is a problem of primary importance across social sciences. In this paper, I focus on one particular but important factor: the gender of the decision maker.
Gender differences in human behaviour have attracted generations of social scientists, who have used economic games to explore whether males and females act differently in a number of domains, including competition (Gneezy, Niederle & Rustichini, 2003; Niederle & Vesterlund, 2007; Gneezy, Leonard & List, 2009) , risk taking (Powell & Ansic, 1997; Byrnes, Miller & Schafer, 1999; Charness & Gneezy, 2012) , cooperation (Rand, 2017) , altruism (Engel, 2011; Rand et al., 2016; Brañas-Garza et al., 2018) , honesty (Capraro, 2018; Gerlach, Teodorescu & Hertwig, 2019; Abeler, Nosenzo & Raymond, in press ), as well as many others (Sunden & Surette, 1998; Croson & Gneezy, 2009; Friesdorf, Conway & Gawronski, 2015) . Yet, very little is known about gender differences in the equity-efficiency trade-off.
One of the reasons for this gap in the literature has been, arguably, the lack of an economic game to measure the equity-efficiency trade-off in the sterile setting of a controlled laboratory experiment with anonymous participants. 1 The newly introduced Trade-Off Game (TOG; Capraro and Rand, 2018; Tappin & Capraro, 2018) fills this gap and thus offers a unique opportunity to study gender differences in the equity-efficiency trade-off. In the TOG, one decision-maker has to choose between two allocations of money that affect the decision-maker itself as well as two other people: one allocation is equitable, that is, it minimises payoff differences among the three players; the other allocation is efficient, that is, it maximises the sum of the payoffs of the three players. The two other people do not make any choice: they are simply paid according to the decision-maker's choice.
Here I analyse all the TOG experiments that my research group has conducted since we introduced this game. This is a large dataset containing N=4,920 observations, divided in 23 experimental treatments, collected among US based participants, recruited on Amazon Mechanical Turk (AMT). 2 This dataset offers an excellent occasion to study gender differences in the equity-efficiency trade-off, not only because of its largeness, but also because of the variety of its experimental treatments. This allows me to explore the role of two potential moderators of theoretical and practical importance.
The first moderator is whether efficiency is aligned with self-interest. In real-life decisions, sometimes, but not always, the equitable choice is costly also for the decision-maker. Since males are known to be more self-regarding than females (Engel, 2011; Rand et al., 2016; Brañas-Garza et al., 2018) , it is important to test whether gender differences in the equity-efficiency trade-off, if existing, are actually driven by gender differences in the weight that people place on self-versus other-interest. The current dataset is ideal to test for this moderator, because in 10 out of the 23 treatments (N=2,470) the equitable option is costly for the decision maker. (See the Method section for details about the exact payoffs.)
The second moderator is the frame of the trade-off game. Real-life decision problems, especially in political debate, are not formulated with a neutral language, but are often framed with a morally loaded language meant to suggest the right thing to do. Therefore, understanding whether gender differences in the equity-efficiency trade-off, if existing, depend on the moral frame of the game is of great practical interest. The current dataset is ideal also to test for this moderator, because 10 treatments (N=1,967) are framed using a language that suggest that being 1 The literature on social preferences has explored whether people tend to prefer equity over efficiency or the converse, using various distribution games (Charness & Rabin, 2002; Engelmann & Strobel, 2004; Fehr, Naef & Schmidt, 2006; Capraro, Smyth, Mylona & Niblo, 2014) . However, these studies do not only pit equity against efficiency, but they also analyse other motivations, as, for example, maximin preferences for maximizing the payoff of the worse off player. Moreover, with only one exception (Fehr et al, 2006) , these studies did not analyse gender differences. Fehr et al (2006) analysed the behaviour of decision-makers who had to decide between three allocations of money: one maximises efficiency, one minimizes inequity, one maximises the payoff of the worse off player. They found that females are weakly significantly more equitable than males. I will discuss this paper in more detail in the Discussion section. 2 AMT is an online labour market that has been shown to produce reliable results on economic games (Paolacci, Chandler & Ipeirotis, 2010; Horton, Rand & Zeckhauser, 2011; Rand, 2012; Paolacci & Chandler, 2014; Arechar, Gächter & Molleman, 2018; Brañas-Garza et al., 2018) . Additionally, the typical AMT sample is more heterogeneous than the classical student sample used in most laboratory experiments (Berinsky, Huber & Lenz, 2012) . equitable is the right thing to do, whereas 7 treatments (N=1,634) are framed in such a way to suggest that the efficient allocation is the right thing to do. (See the Method section for details about the frames.)
The resulting analysis provides evidence of two major findings: (i) females are more equitable than males; (ii) gender differences are moderated by the moral framing of the TOG: they are particularly evident when the equitable option is framed as being the right thing to do, compared to when the moral frame is placed on the efficient option.
Method
The dataset I analyse N=4,920 US based participants recruited on AMT (see Appendix, Table A1 , for descriptive statistics about the sample). All these participants played the Trade-Off Game (TOG).
In the TOG, one decision-maker has to choose between two allocations of money that affect the decision-maker itself and two other players. One allocation is equitable, that is, it minimises payoff differences among the three players; the other allocation is efficient, that is, it maximises the sum of the payoffs of the three players. The details of the experiments depend on the particular treatment. The dataset contains 23 treatments, which can be classified in five main (non-exclusive) groups.
Trade-Off Game in which efficiency and self-interest are aligned (10 treatments, N=2,469) The equitable allocation is [13 13 13] , that is, each player receives $0.13; the efficient allocation is [15 23 13] , that is, the decision maker receives $0.15, Player B receives $0.23, and Player C receives $0.13.
Trade-Off Game without the "selfish confound" (13 treatments, N=2,451) The equitable allocation is [13 13 13] ; the efficient allocation is [13 23 13].
Trade-Off game with comprehension questions (9 treatments, N=1,666) Participants are asked two comprehension questions: (i) "What choice should you make if you want all players involved to get the same payoff?" (ii) "What choice should you make if you want to maximize the total group payoff (i.e., the sum of your bonus plus the bonuses of Players A and B)?" In the TOGs with comprehension questions, I include in the analysis only participants who responded to both comprehension questions correctly.
Trade-Off game in the equitable frame (10 treatments, N=1,966)
The equitable option is presented with a positively loaded language and/or the efficient option is presented with a negatively loaded language. The frame has been implemented in several different ways depending on the study. For example, Capraro and Rand's (2018) Study 1 labels the equitable choice as the "nice" choice and the efficient choice as the "non nice" choice. Capraro and Rand's (2018) Study 3 labels the equitable choice as "the more fair choice" and the efficient choice as the "less fair" choice. Tappin and Capraro (2018) labels the equitable option as the "fair" choice and the efficient choice as "Option 2". In the same study, another treatment labels the equitable option as "Option 1" and the efficient option as "unfair". All these manipulations had the effect of making participants more likely to choose the equitable allocation. Effect sizes were independent of the particular manipulation being used. Moreover, Capraro and Rand's (2018) Study 4 shows that this labelling technique has the effect of changing participants' perception of what is the morally right thing to do.
Trade-Off game in the efficient frame (7 treatments, N=1,633) The efficient option is presented with a positively loaded language and/or the equitable option is presented with a negatively loaded language. In particular, this has been implemented in several different ways. For example, Capraro and Rand's (2018) Study 1 labels the efficient choice as the "nice" choice and the equitable choice as the "non nice" choice. Capraro and Rand's (2018) Study 3 labels the efficient choice as the "more generous" choice and the equitable choice as the "less generous" choice. Tappin and Capraro (2018) labels the efficient option as the "generous" choice and the equitable choice as "Option 2". In the same study, another treatment labels the efficient option as "Option 1" and the equitable option as "ungenerous". All these techniques had the effect of making participants more likely to choose the efficient allocation. Effect sizes were independent of the particular technique used. Moreover, Capraro and Rand's (2018) Study 4 shows that this labelling technique has the effect of changing participants' perception of what is the morally right thing to do.
Trade-Off game in the neutral frame (6 treatments, N=1,218) One option is called "Option 1", the other one is called "Option 2".
Variables
To analyse the dataset, I introduce a number of individual-and study-level variables. There are two main individual-level variables: equal_choice is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the corresponding individual chooses the equitable option in the TOG; female is a self-explanatory dummy variable. I also have individual-level data on age and, for 19 treatments (N=4,137), on education. See Appendix, Table A1 , for the descriptive statistics of the sample. All the subsequent analyses will be first conducted without control on age and education, and then repeated adding these controls as a robustness check. The results remain qualitatively the same when adding the controls (see Appendix for statistical details).
There are five study-level variables: efficient_selfish is a dummy variable equal to 1 if, in the corresponding study, the efficient choice maximises the payoff of the decision-maker; comprehension is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the corresponding study contains comprehension questions; equitable_frame is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the corresponding study is framed such that the equitable choice is presented as being the morally right thing to do; efficient_frame is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the corresponding study is framed such that the efficient choice is presented as being the morally right thing to do; neutral is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the corresponding study is presented with neutral instructions.
Results
As a first step of the analysis, I look at the overall effect of female on equal_choice. Logistic regression predicting equal_choice as a function of female reveals a highly significant effect (b=0.315, z=5.34, p<.001) such that females are more likely than males to choose the equitable option (42.9% vs 35.5%). See Figure 1 for a visual representation and the Appendix, Tables A2,  A3 , for statistical details. Next, I test whether these gender differences are robust for controlling for two potential confounds. The first possible source of confound is that, in some of the studies, the efficient option is aligned with the payoff-maximising option. Since previous meta-analyses using the dictator game found that males are more self-regarding than females (Engel, 2011; Rand et al., 2016; Brañas-Garza et al., 2018) , it is in principle possible that gender differences in TOG choices are entirely driven by males being more self-regarding than females. To exclude this, I conduct logistic regression predicting equal_choice as a function of female, efficient_selfish and their interaction female X efficient_selfish. Results reveal no significant interaction effect (p=0.426), a significant main effect of efficient_selfish (b=-0.346, z=-4.347, p<0.001), and a significant main effect of female (b=0.340, z=4.150, p<0.001). The negative main effect of efficient_selfish is not surprising, and simply reflects the fact that, when self-interest is aligned with efficiency, people are more likely to choose the efficient option compared to when it is not aligned. The significant main effect of female and the lack of a significant interaction female X efficient_selfish suggest that gender differences in TOG choices are not driven by the efficient option being aligned with the self-regarding option. This is also reflected in the average TOG choices: gender differences in TOG choices are actually numerically slightly lower in the TOGs in which efficiency and self-interest are aligned (mean equal_choice for males = 31.7%; mean equal_choice for females = 37.3%; difference = 5.6 percentage points), compared to when they are not (mean equal_choice for males = 39.6%; mean equal_choice for females = 48.0%; difference = 8.4 percentage points). See Appendix, Tables A2, A3, for statistical details.
The second potential source of confound is comprehension. Since some of the TOG treatments contain comprehension questions while others do not, it is crucial to make sure that gender differences in TOG choices are not driven by participants not comprehending the decision problem. Logistic regression predicting equal_choice as a function of female, comprehension, and their interaction reveals a significant main effect of comprehension (b=0.168, z=1.981, p=0.047), a significant main effect of female (b=0.257, z=3.501, p=0.005) and a non-significant interaction (p=0.279). The significant effect of comprehension suggests that people who understand the decision problem are more equitable than those who do not (42.6% vs 36.7%). Importantly, however, the lack of a significant interaction suggests that gender differences in TOG choices are not driven by participants not comprehending the decision problem. This is also reflected in average TOG choices: gender differences are numerically actually slightly higher when comprehension questions are being asked (mean equal_choice for males = 38.1%; mean equal_choice for females = 47.6%; difference = 9.5 percentage points), compared to when they are not being asked (mean equal_choice for males = 34.2%; mean equal_choice for females = 40.2%; difference = 6.0 percentage points). See Appendix, Tables A2, A3, for statistical details.
I now move to the moderating role of framing the TOG using loaded language in such a way to suggest that one option is morally better than the other one. I start with the equitable frame. Logistic regression predicting equal_choice as a function of female, equitable_frame, and their interaction, reveals a nearly significant interaction effect (b=0.231, z=1.903, p=0.057), a significant main effect of the equitable_frame (b=0.683, z=8.452, p<0.001), and a significant main effect of gender (b=0.240, z=3.015, p=0.003). The significant, positive, main effect of equitable_frame is not surprising and simply replicates previous findings that people are more likely to choose the equitable option when it is positively framed, compared to when it is neutrally or negatively framed (Capraro & Rand, 2018; Tappin & Capraro, 2018) . The nearly significant interaction female X equitable_frame (which is actually significant when controlling for age and education: b=0.200, z=2.319, p=0.020) suggests that gender differences tend to be larger in the equitable frame, compared to the efficient frame and the neutral frame. This is also reflected in the average TOG choices: when equitable_frame=1, gender differences are 11.7 percentage points (mean equal_choice for males = 44.8%; mean equal_choice for females = 56.5%), compared to only 5.1 percentage points when equitable_frame=0 (mean equal_choice for males = 29.1%; mean equal_choice for females = 34.2%. See Appendix, Table A4 , for statistical details.
A similar result holds for the efficient frame. Logistic regression predicting equal_choice as a function of female, efficient_frame, and their interaction, reveals a nearly significant negative interaction effect (b=-0.234, z=-1.729, p=0.083), a significant negative main effect of efficient_frame (b=-0.806, z=-8.993, p<0.001), and a significant main effect of gender (b= 0.371, z=5.257, p<0.001). Again, the significant, negative, main effect of efficient_frame is not surprising, and simply replicates previous findings that people are less likely to choose the equitable option when that is not presented with a positively loaded language, compared when it is (Capraro & Rand, 2018; Tappin & Capraro, 2018) . The nearly significant, negative, interaction female X equitable_frame (which is actually significant when controlling for age and education: b=-0.350, z=-2.239, p=0.025) suggests that gender differences tend to be weaker in the efficient frame, compared to the equitable frame and the neutral frame. This is also reflected in the TOG average choices: when efficient_frame=1, gender differences in TOG choices are only 2.6 percentage points (mean equal_choice for males = 24.0%; mean equal_choice for females = 26.6%), compared to 9.2 percentage points when efficient_frame=0 (mean equal_choice for males = 41.4%; mean equal_choice for females = 50.6%). See Appendix, Table A4 , for statistical details.
Finally, I explore more in detail how gender differences vary as a function of frame, by making pairwise comparisons between the equitable frame, the efficient frame, and the neutral frame. In doing so, I find that the interaction effect is not significant when comparing the equitable frame with the neutral frame (p=0.193) and when comparing the efficient frame with the neutral frame (p=0.373). This suggests that the moderating effect of framing is driven by both the equitable and the efficient frames. Indeed, logistic regression predicting equal_choice as a function of female, efficient_frame and their interaction, restricted to neutral=0, finds a significant interaction (b=-0.333, z=-2.264, p=0.024). Looking at the main effect of gender across frames, I find that females are significantly more equitable than males in the equalize frame (56.5% vs 44.8%; b=0.472, z=5.133, p<0.001) and in the neutral frame (42.7% vs 36.0%; b=0.282, z=2.491, p=0.012), but not in the efficient frame (26.6% vs 24.0%; p=0.230). See Figure 2 for a visual representation of these results, and the appendix, Tables A5, A6, for statistical details.
Figure 2. Average equitable choice by gender and frame.
There is an interaction effect such that gender differences are significantly larger in the equitable frame than in the efficient frame. The neutral frame lies in between, although gender differences in the neutral frame are neither statistically different from gender differences in equitable frame, nor statistically different from gender differences in the efficient frame. Error bars represent the standard error of the mean.
Discussion
To summarise, I studied gender differences in the equity-efficiency trade-off on a large dataset of N=4,970 observations. The analysis provides evidence of two major results: (i) females are more likely than males to choose the equitable option; (ii) gender differences are particularly evident when the equitable option is framed as being the morally right thing to do, compared to when it is the efficient option that is framed as being morally right.
Previous works have explored gender differences in competition (Gneezy, Niederle & Rustichini, 2003; Niederle & Vesterlund, 2007; Gneezy, Leonard & List, 2009 ), risk taking (Powell & Ansic, 1997; Byrnes, Miller & Schafer, 1999; Charness & Gneezy, 2012) , cooperation (Rand, 2017) , altruism (Engel, 2011; Rand et al., 2016; Brañas-Garza et al., 2018) , honesty (Capraro, 2018; Gerlach, Teodorescu & Hertwig, 2019; Abeler, Nosenzo & Raymond, in press) , as well as in many other domains (Sunden & Surette, 1998; Croson & Gneezy, 2009; Friesdorf, Conway & Gawronski, 2015) . The current results extend this literature, by showing that gender differences are present also in the equity-efficiency trade-off. This is a particularly valuable addition, because people in power of redistributing resources often face a conflict between equity and efficiency.
To the best of my knowledge, this is the first study exploring gender differences in the equityefficiency trade-off. Four earlier studies are indirectly related to the current investigation.
The first study, by Andreoni and Vesterlund (2001) , analysed gender differences in a series of modified dictator games, with varying cost to benefit ratio -that is, in these economic games, one player had to decide whether to pay a cost c to give a benefit b to the other player. They found that females are more altruistic than males when c ³ b, but males are more altruistic than females when c < b. Although Andreoni and Vesterlund's design do not directly pit equity against efficiency, its results can be reinterpreted in light of this trade-off. Taking into account that, when the cost of the altruistic action is smaller than its benefit, altruism maximises efficiency, Andreoni and Vesterlund's results are in line with the view emerging from the current finding that males tend to prefer efficiency to a larger extent than females.
The second study, by Fehr, Naef and Schmidt (2006) , analysed gender differences in situations in which the decision-maker has to choose between three allocations of money: one maximises efficiency, one minimises inequity, and one maximises the payoff of the worse off player. In doing so, they found that females are weakly significantly more egalitarian than men. Although Fehr, Naef and Schmidt's design does not explicitly pit equity versus efficiency, it is nevertheless reassuring that their results are in line with the current work. Additionally, also the effect sizes are similar: 10 percentage points in Fehr et al's (2006) study, 7 percentage points in this work. This also suggests that the reason why Fehr et al. (2006) found only a weakly significant effect was probably the small sample (120 subjects) that limited their capacity to detect relatively small effect sizes.
The third study, by Alesina and Giuliano (2011) , analysed self-reported responses to the General Social Survey (in the US) and to the World Value Survey (across the world) and found that females are more pro-redistribution than males. However, the questions analysed by Alesina and Giuliano do not explicitly pit equity against efficiency: for example, in a typical question, responders are asked to rate the statement "People should take more responsibility to provide for themselves" versus the statement "The government should take more responsibility to ensure that everyone is provided for". Moreover, Alesina and Giuliano focused on judgments, rather than economically-incentivised, actual behaviour. This, also, is a potentially important difference, because previous work suggests that people might behave differently in hypothetical versus real distribution games (Amir, Rand & Gal, 2012) . Nevertheless, it is comforting that the results of Alesina and Giuliano are broadly in line with the current finding that females are, on average, more equitable than males.
The fourth study, by Durante, Putterman and Van der Weele (2014) , is the more similar to the current work. They implemented an economic tax-game in which participants had to choose which tax to implement in a group of twenty tax payers, whose initial distribution of money mirrored the distribution of the pre-tax incomes in the US population. Participants had to choose the tax in four different treatments: in the first treatment, tax payers' position in the initial distribution of incomes was random; in the second treatment, it was computed by ranking the average incomes of tax payers' places of origin; in the third treatment, it was determined by their performance in a SAT-like quiz test; in the fourth treatment, it mirrored their score in a computer-based game. Moreover, Durante, Putterman and Van der Weele conducted some sessions in which the implementation of the tax was costless for the decision maker, some sessions in which the implementation of the tax was costly for the decision maker, and some sessions in which the implementation of the tax led to an efficiency loss. Overall, they found that females are more pro-redistribution than males, even when the tax was associated to an efficiency loss. However, interestingly, in the case in which the initial distribution of incomes was random -which is the treatment that most closely resembles the Trade-Off game -they found no gender differences, but only a slight trend, according to which the average tax implemented by females was 4 percentage points higher than the average tax implemented by males. This effect size is in line with the effect size of the current study (7 percentage points). Therefore, the lack of a significant effect in Durante et al. (2014) might have been driven by a lack of statistical power to detect relatively small effect sizes.
In sum, the current study goes beyond previous works on gender differences in resource distribution along three dimensions. First, it uses a clean, economically-incentivised, design explicitly pitting equity against efficiency. Second, it explores also the effect of moderators that are likely to play an important role in real distribution decisions, such as the language used to describe the available actions. Finally, it is based on a large sample size, which consents to detect small effect sizes and to minimise the presence of false positives. This is also a valuable point, especially in light of the current Replicability Crisis (Open Science Collaboration, 2015; Camerer et al., 2018) .
This study has, nevertheless, several limitations. The first one is that the dataset does not contain observations in which equity benefits the decision-maker. Since males are known to be more self-regarding than females (Engel, 2011; Rand et al., 2016; Brañas-Garza et al., 2018) , the obvious prediction is that gender differences in the equity-efficiency trade-off would decrease, and perhaps even reverse, if equity becomes beneficial for the decision-maker. Future work could test this hypothesis. The second limitation regards the stakes of the TOG, which, in all treatments, are relatively small. Previous work suggests that stakes have no effect on people's behaviour in a number of economic games involving pro-sociality, at least when stakes are not too high (Forsythe et al., 1994; Carpenter, Verhoogen, & Burks, 2005; Johansson-Stenman, Mahmud, & Martinsson, 2005; Brañas-Garza et al., 2018; Larney, Rotella, & Barclay, 2019) ; other studies have indeed found evidence that pro-sociality decreases at very high stakes (Carpenter et al., 2005; Andersen, Ertaç, Gneezy, Hoffman, & List, 2011) . There have been no studies exploring the stake effect on the equity-efficiency trade-off. Testing whether this tradeoff varies as a function of the stakes and, if it does so, testing how this variation interacts with gender is an interesting direction for future research. The third limitation is that this dataset does not allow to answer the question of why females are more likely than males to choose the equitable option. At this stage of research, I can only speculate. An influential line of literature suggests that gender differences in behaviour are partly due to the different roles that males and females tend to occupy in society (Eagly, 1987; Eagly & Wood, 1999) . Along these lines, one potential explanation for the current findings is that, along the evolution, males have been primarily in charge of creating resources, while females have been primarily in charge of distributing resources. With such a division of roles, it is optimal to create resources efficiently (to maximise the total amount of resources), but then to distribute them equitably (to minimise within-group conflicts). Therefore, it is possible that gender differences in social roles have led to the internalisation of efficiency for males and equity for females. Exploring this and potentially other explanations is an important avenue for future research.
In sum, this work shows that females, on average, distribute resources more equitably than males and that this gender difference interacts with the moral framing of the decision problem. Table A3 . Logistic regressions predicting equal_choice as a function of female, with and without the control on efficient_selfish and comprehension. All these regressions include controls on age and education.
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(2) Table A4 . Logistic regressions exploring whether sex differences in TOG choices depend on how the TOG is framed (part 1). Comparison between sex differences when a give frame is implemented (e.g., Equitable_frame = 1) with sex differences when the same frame is not implemented (e.g., Equitable_frame = 0).
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